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MANAGEMENT AND LABOR APPRAISALS AND
CRITICISMS OF THE ARBITRATION PROCESS:
A REPORT WITH COMMENTS

Dallas L. Jones* and Russell A. Smith**
arbitration as a means of resolving disputes arising
under collective bargaining agreements has received widespread acceptance in this country/ in recent years there has been
some evidence of increasing criticism of the process.2 As part of
a research project dealing with the impact of the 1960 Supreme
Court decisions in the Warrior & Gulf "trilogy"8 and the 1962
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• Professor of Industrial Relations, Graduate School of Business Administration, The
University of Michigan.-Ed .
.. Professor of Law, The University of Michigan; President-elect, National Academy
of Arbitrators.-Ed.
1 Professor R. W. Fleming in his paper, The Labor Arbitration Process: 1943-1963,
given in January 1964, at the 17th Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitra•
tors reported: "I am told that an as yet unpublished study by the BLS will show that in
1961-1962 approximately 94 per cent of the agreements examined [presumably in the
BLS files] contained grievance arbitration clauses."
2 See generally Aaron, Labor Arbitration and Its Critics, 10 LAB. L.J. 605 (1959); Fer•
guson, An Appraisal of Labor Arbitration-A Management Viewpoint, 8 IND. &: LAB. REL.
REv. 79 (1954-55); Iserman, The Arbitrator in Grievance Procedures: Is Arbitration the
Way To Settle Labor Disputes?, 35 A.B.A.J. 987 (1949); Katz, Challengeable Trends in
Labor Arbitration, 7 ARB. J. (n.s.) 12 (1952); Manson, Is Arbitration Expendable?, N.Y.U.
12TH ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 1 (1959); Murphy, Arbitration: Evaluation of Its Role in
Labor Relations, N.Y.U. 12TII ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 281 (1959); Platt, Current Criti•
cisms of Labor Arbitration, ARBITRATION AND THE LAw vii (BNA 1959).
8 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). For the results of a preliminary survey on the
impacts of these decisions, see Smith, Arbitrability-The Arbitrator, the Courts and the
Parties, 17 ARB. J. (n.s.) 3 (1962), which is an abridgment of Smith, The Question of "Arbitrability"-The Roles of the Arbitrator, the Court, and the Parties, 16 Sw. L.J. I
(1962). Sec also Aaron, Arbitration in the Federal Courts: Aftermath of the Trilogy, 9
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 360 (1962).
Other discussions of the "Trilogy" include Davey, The Supreme Court and Arbitration:
The Musings of an Arbitrator, 36 NoTRE DAME LAw. 138 (1961); Gregory, Enforcement
of Collective Agreements by Arbitration, 48 VA. L. REv. 883 (1962); Hays, The Supreme
Court and Labor Law-October Term, 1959, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 901 (1960); Levitt, The
Supreme Court and Arbitration, N.Y.U. 14TII ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 217 (1961); Meltzer,
The Supreme Court, Arbitrability, and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 464
(1961); Wallen, Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Arbitration: An Arbitrator's View,
63 W. VA. L. REv. 295 (1961); Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise To Arbitrate,
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 471 (1962); Symposium-Arbitration and the Courts, 58 Nw. U.L. REv.
466, 494, 521, 556 (1963).
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Sinclair "trilogy,"4 we decided to ascertain how parties are appraising the arbitration process. We report here the more significant results of this survey along with our evaluation of the criticisms and suggestions which were received.IS
The two questions asked which evoked the responses upon
which this article is based were:
(I) Are you generally satisfied with the arbitration process, or,
given a choice, would you prefer leaving all issues of contract application to the courts, or to collective bargaining
(including strike action)?
(2) What suggestions do you have for improving the arbitration process?

A. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
By an overwhelming majority our respondents indicate that
they prefer the arbitration process to the available alternatives as
a method of ultimate resolution of contract application (grievance)
disputes. Only some five percent of our "management" respon4 Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370
U.S. 238 (1962); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). For discussions of
these cases, see Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered
Questions, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1027 (1963); Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised,
IO U.C.L.A.L. REv. 292, 337-43 (1963); Burstein, Labor Arbitration-A Management View,
N.Y.U. 16TH .ANN. CoNFERENCE oN LAB. 297, 317-18 (1963); Dannett, Norris-LaGuardia
and Injunctions in Labor Arbitration Cases, N.Y.U. 16TH .ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 275
(1963); Isaacson, The Grand Equation: Labor Arbitration and the No-Strike Clause, 48
A.B.A.J. 914 (1962); Marshall, Enforcing the Labor Contract, 14 LAB. L.J. 353, 356-57
(1963); Marshall, Section JOI-Problems and Prospects, LABOR ARllITRATION & INDUSTRIAL
CHANGE 146, 151-55 (BNA 1963) and discussions by Frederic D. Anderson at 159-65 and
David Previant at 172-74; Pfister, Arbitration and the Supreme Court 1962 Spring Term,
4 Aruz. L. REv. 200 (1963); Stutz, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, LABOR ARllITRATION
&: INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 54, 64-67 (BNA 1963); Sullivan & Tomlin, The Supreme Court and
Section JOI of the Labor Management Relations Act, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 214, 228-30, 239-41
(1963); Vladeck, Injunctive Relief Against Strikes in Breach of the Labor Agreement,
N.Y.U. 16TH .ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 289 (1963); Weiss, Labor Arbitration and the
1961-1962 Supreme Court, 51 GEo. L.J. 284 (1963); Wellington &: Albert, Statutory Inter•
pretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J.

1547 (1963).

IS A total of 715 letters of inquiry were sent to management representatives (directors
of industrial relations and labor counsels) or to independent attorneys representing man•
agement. There were 306 responses, 42 of which offered no assistance. Two hundred
ninety letters were sent to union officials (international officers and general counsels) or
to other attorneys representing unions. We received 90 responses, 13 of which offered
no assistance.
The study was not conceived, however, as a statistical survey. We were concerned
more with quality than with quantity and hoped to receive the considered judgment
of knowledgeable people in the field. Our list of potential correspondents was developed
from various sources, including members of the National Academy of Arbitrators. The
names thus supplied were carefully reviewed, and to them were added others in an
attempt to obtain adequate coverage both of industry and section of the country.
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dents (including lawyers representing management) indicate a
preference for resort to the courts, or a preference for exclusive
reliance on the collective bargaining process including permissive
strike action. Not a single union official respondent prefers either
of such methods as an alternative to arbitration. Four attorneys
representing unions indicate a preference for the collective bargaining-strike route alternative, but none prefers the route of litigation. A few respondents from each side indicate that there are
instances in which the collective bargaining process, including
possible strike action, might be preferable for "strategic" reasons,
but they would still select arbitration as the end process for most
disputes.
The reasons stated for preferring arbitration over judicial litigation of contract application issues are the traditional onescourt action is too slow, cumbersome, and expensive, as compared
with arbitration, and arbitrators, by virtue of their "expertise,"
are better equipped than judges to decide such issues. The few
who state a preference for the judicial process do so on various
grounds. Some think the "traditional" views are factually incorrect. 6 Others make the invidious charge that arbitrators (or at
least some of them) lack the "courage" to make clear-cut, firm decisions for fear of "losing business" and tend to "split" decisions.
Some indicate dissatisfaction with the finality of the arbitrator's
decision, and hence prefer the litigator's opportunity for appellate
review. In part, those who express this view believe there is no
effective way, as law and practice now stand, to limit the power
of the arbitrator.
A few respondents, principally from the management side, who
prefer collective bargaining, including potential strike action, over
other methods of settling contract application issues, express some
of the same kinds of dissatisfaction with the arbitration process
6 One respondent states: "In a court of law you are reasonably sure of what the law
provides before you initiate a lawsuit, and your main concern is whether you can introduce facts in support of your theory of law. In an arbitration proceeding you are just
as unsure of your facts, but you are also unable to determine the law of your contract,
and it makes little difference whether you are speaking of the general principles of arbitration law or the principles followed by a particular arbitrator. I am sure we are all
aware of the fact that several nationally known arbitrators have decided the subcontracting question in separate cases on completely inconsistent theories."
We have some disagreement with our respondent to the extent he thinks there is
more predictability or certainty as to "the law," even of contract interpretation, in judicial than in arbitration proceedings. In our multifarious judicial system, state and
federal, instances of irreconcilable conflict between decisions are numerous, and even the
highest appellate tribunals, including the United States Supreme Court, often increase
areas of uncertainty by overruling, modifying, or qualifying previously established rules.
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noted above, as well as the traditional reasons for rejecting the
alternative of judicial litigation. Some frankly believe that management would do better with collective bargaining because
unions would be less disposed to strike than to arbitrate in view
of the financial loss involved in strike action and the political difficulties of obtaining membership approval of strike action, especially in the case of grievances important only to a single individual or to a small group within the bargaining unit. On the other
hand, some of our union respondents indicate that this is one of
the reasons they prefer arbitration to collective bargaining or to
judicial litigation. They believe that individual claims wouid
often have to be disregarded, and thereby contractual rights would
become less meaningful, if the final resolution of such claims depended upon strike action or judicial litigation.7
A substantial number of our respondents not only prefer arbitration over the other available alternatives, but also indicate they
are generally satisfied with the arbitration process as they now find
it, and offer no suggestions for its improvement. On the other
hand, many, although generally of the opinion that arbitration is
the best of the viable alternatives, indicate dissatisfactions of various kinds, and hold that the process can and should be improved.
Criticisms range rather broadly. There is a very substantial
concern, especially on the management side, with the scope of the
arbitrator's power. This stems in part, but only in part, from the
Warrior & Gulf trilogy, and has evoked interest in establishing
some kind of arbitral "review." Many of our respondents express
the desire to see improvements in arbitration procedure, including
methods of selecting arbitrators and a reduction in the time and
expense involved in arbitration. Overwhelmingly, our respondents who think things could be improved single out for special
attention the arbitrator himself. They do not seem to share Mr.
Justice Douglas's view, as expressed in the Warrior trilogy, that the
arbitrator is possessed of extraordinarily superior talents, bordering on the occult, for dealing with the issues. Indeed, they would
like to see him achieve a higher quality performance standard than
they claim to have encountered. (Naturally, some arbitrators seem
7 We agree that management would "gain," in a sense, by the elimination of arbitration in that unions probably would be disinclined to strike over some matters that
would ordinarily be arbitrated. Accordingly, management would not be risking an
adverse decision. But the "gain" in particular cases might be offset by an end product
of severe employee and union dissatisfaction with the non-resolution of grievances, which
could increase the intensity of strike action in those cases where such action is taken.
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to have reached the pinnacle, but they apparently are considered
to be few in number.)
Our general impression from the survey leads us to believe
that arbitration is not seriously threatened, at least at this time,
by any of its possible competitors; there is, however, a substantial amount of discontent with some aspects of the process.
We think the criticisms and suggestions for improvement are sufficiently widespread to deserve careful consideration. Not all of the
suggestions advanced will be discussed, because some lack anything
resembling widespread support, and others, in our judgment, are
specious or capricious. In what follows we shall undertake a review and appraisal of the suggestions made in the problem areas
which appear to be of greatest concern or merit.
We conclude these introductory remarks with a note on the
lighter side. We have gained the rather distinct impression from
our survey that the lawyers involved in labor relations, whether
representing management or unions, tend to be more concerned
than "laymen" (industrial relations directors and union officials)
about the inadequacies of the arbitration process. What this signifies we would not, if we could, attempt to say, since the coauthors are, respectively, a layman and a lawyer-more accurately,
a labor economics professor and a law professor.8

B.

MAJOR AREAS OF CONCERN WITH THE ARBITRATION PROCESS

I. The Arbitrator's "Power" and the Finality of His
Decision: Should There Be "Review" Procedures?
There is no doubt that the scope of the arbitrator's authority,
and the legal finality of his award, are matters of some concern.
This concern is seen especially on the management side, although
the range and depth of feeling on these matters varies widely. There
likewise appears to be no doubt that this apprehension, although
of long standing, has been substantially increased in consequence
of the Supreme Court's 1960 decisions in the Warrior & Gulf
trilogy. These decisions have been interpreted, correctly we think,
as having sharply reduced the opportunity to make effective use
of the courts in either an attempt to intercept the submission of
8 ·we also do some arbitrating, and we issue the caveat that, since we believe in the
process and arc to some extent involved in it, our appraisals of the criticisms and suggestions offered by our respondents may be colored somewhat by a bias which we
cannot escape. On the other hand, our participation in the process may perhaps serve
the useful purpose of giving us a perspective or basis for judgment based on a certain
amount of experience.
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issues to arbitration or to upset the awards which result. One
management representative stated:
"In general, we are satisfied with the arbitration process.
It provides a speedy, fair, and inexpensive means to resolve
disputes. However, we are beginning to be concerned with
the doctrine of non-reviewability (for all practical purposes)
of arbitration decisions. The 1960 trilogy and subsequent •
decisions have placed upon arbitrators a degree of responsibility that tends to produce chills upon appropriate body locations. When one combines the doctrine of non-reviewability
with the complex and explosive questions of plant relocation,
vesting of seniority rights, etc., you have the potential ingredients necessary for unions and/or employers to begin considering new tribunals of original and/ or appellate jurisdiction. In effect, I am suggesting that perhaps on the immediate
horizon is the need for a middle ground regarding the
reviewability of certain arbitration awards."
The fear, to put the matter baldly, is of the power of the arbitrator to render a "bad," non-reviewable decision. One result, as
our survey shows, has been the expenditure of much energy and
thought on possible collective bargaining answers to this problem,
usually aimed at contract provisions limiting the scope of the
arbitrator's authority, and, hopefully, increasing the opportunity
for attack upon "improper" assumptions of arbitral authority.
Another result has been to consider or undertake changes in the
"law" through legislation which would increase the scope of judicial review of arbitration proceedings.
We shall not attempt here to report in detail on either of these
two approaches to the "problem" of arbitral power. This will be
done elsewhere. For present purposes it will suffice to make some
very general, and to some extent obvious, observations. The collective bargaining approach to the problem presents the parties with
an entire gamut of possibilities, ranging, on the one hand, from
total rejection of arbitration, or provision for its use on an ad hoc
consensual basis only, to the inclusion in the agreement of specific
and detailed limitations on the use of the process both as to subject
matter and as to remedy, even including the requirement of judicial determination of "arbitrability" upon demand of either party
as a prerequisite to arbitral jurisdiction to proceed.9 There is
9 The most widely publicized recent example of the restrictive approach is reprc•
sented by the elaborate provisions which General Electric Company succeeded in obtain-
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little doubt that carefully written contractual restrictions on the
scope of arbitration would reduce substantially the dangers of
"usurpation" of authority by arbitrators, not only because arbitrators in general can be expected to respect specific limitations on
their authority, but also because, if they do not, the courts will be
available to patch any obvious breaches in the dam. We use the
word "obvious" advisedly, however, because we do not wish at
this point to indicate any pre-judgment of the kinds of decisions
which the courts might make in a proper application of the 1960
trilogy cases where, for example, there might be a dispute over
the meaning of the very language used by the parties in their
attempt to define the limits of arbitral authority.
Nor, of course, is there any doubt that the "problem" of arbitral authority could be met through legislation, and in some measure resolved. The scope of judicial review of arbitrability issues,
as now restricted by the 1960 trilogy decisions, could be enlarged.
Indeed, provision could be made for a general "appellate" review
of arbitrators' decisions, both as to fact and as to "law," either with
or without requiring judicial deference to any of the conclusions
reached by the arbitrator. It seems obvious, however, that the
commonly accepted values of the arbitration process will apply
inversely with the extent of resort to the courts to avoid either
the use or the results of the process. This is not to say that the
courts should not be available-indeed, under our law they must
be-to prevent assumptions of authority by the arbitrator which
the parties clearly intended to withhold from him. 10 But we seriously question whether the risk of improvident, unsound, or insupportable decisions, either on issues of arbitral authority or on
the merits of the issue of contract interpretation or applicationand such risk there undoubtedly is-should be "remedied"
ing in its 1963 negotiations with the IUE. This was one instance in which management
decided to make the "arbitrability" issue a major one, and evidently succeeded in its
objectives. Many of our management respondents have thought that, ideally, a major
effort of this kind would be desirable, but for various reasons have either refrained from
presenting the issue in collective bargaining or, having made proposals, have ultimately
withdrawn them. Many other respondents, however, succeeded in negotiating limitations
on the arbitrator's authority.
10 While the Supreme Court in the 1960 trilogy cases reduced the scope of judicial
authority to reject the arbitration process, the Court recognized that "the question of
arbitrability is for the courts to decide." United Steelworkers v. Warrior 8e Gulf Nav. Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7 (1963). The Court was addressing its remarks to the point that,
except for parties subject to the Railway Labor Act or to a few state statutes (applicable
to public utilities, and then only where not "pre-empted" by the National Labor Relations Act), arbitration in this country rests not upon legislative mandate, but upon the
agreement of the parties.
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through increased availability of resort to the courts, at least as
our judicial system is now constructed in relation to such questions. Whether a separate set of federal "labor courts" might be
a more appropriate answer, perhaps even to the exclusion of private arbitration as in some other countries, is a different question
which we will not explore here.11
Some of our respondents, while sharing a general aversion to
increased judicial intervention, wonder if some method of meeting the problem might be found within the arbitration system
itself. Thus there is posed the question of how to obtain the review of an arbitration award without unduly sacrificing the values
of the present arbitration process. This presupposes that judicial
review, despite the 1960 trilogy, is still available to prevent clear
excesses of jurisdiction, and on other grounds disassociated from
the "merits" of the underlying issue of contract interpretation,
such as lack of a fair hearing.
A few of our respondents suggest that the National Academy
of Arbitrators, on its own initiative, should establish review procedures. This suggestion reveals a lack of understanding of the functions of the Academy. The Academy is a professional organization
concerned with the quality of the labor dispute arbitration process.12 It has some 310 members, including many, if not most, of
11 Notable instances of the use of "labor courts" to decide contract interpretation
matters are to be found in France, Germany, and some of the Scandinavian countries.
See generally BRAUN, LABoR DISPUTES AND THEIR SETILEMENT chs. IX-XI (rev. ed. 1955);
MYERS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SWEDEN (1951); SLABY, THE LABOR COURT IN NORWAY
(Oslo Norwegian Academic Press, 1952); 2 SMITH, LABOR LA.w, CASES AND MATERIALS 188-96
(1954); Adlercreutz, Some Features of Swedish Collective Labour Law, 10 MODERN L. REv.
137, 140, 142-48 (1947); Cole, The Role of the Labor Courts in Western Germany, 18
J. PoL. 479-98 (1956); Cole, National Socialism and the German Labor Courts, 3 J. PoL.
169 (1941); Colton, The Rejection of Compulsory Arbitration in France: The New Law
on the Settlement of Labor Disputes, 6 ARB. J. (n.s.) 42 (1951); Kerr, Collective Bargaining
in Postwar Germany, 5 IND. &: LAB. REL. REv. 323, 335-36 (1951-52); Kronstein, Collective
Bargaining in Germany: Before 1933 and After 1945, l AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 203, 211
(1952); Lester, Reflections on Collective Bargaining in Britain and Sweden, 10 IND. &: LAB.
REL. REv. 375, 386, 386 n.37, 399 (1956-57); McPherson, Basic Issues in German Labor
Court Structure, 5 LAB. L.J. 439 (1954); Meyers, Labor Relations in France, 3 CALIF.
MGMT. REv. 46 (1961); Nye, The Status of the Collective Labor Agreement in France,
55 MICH. L. REv. 655 (1957); Reich, Collective Bargaining: The United States and Ger•
many, 8 LAB. L.J. 339, 345-46 (1957); Schmidt &: Heineman, Enforcement of Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Swedish Law, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 184 (1946-47); Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agreement-A Comparison of
Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421 (1963); Taft, Book Review, 1 IND. &: LAB.
REL. REV. 163 (1947-48).
12 The Academy was organized in 1947. Article II, § 1 of its constitution provides:
"The purposes for which the Academy is formed are: To establish and foster the highest
standards of integrity, competence, honor, and character among those engaged in the
arbitration of industrial disputes on a professional basis; to adopt and encourage the
acceptance of and adherence to canons of ethics to govern the conduct of arbitrators; to
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the more active and experienced arbitrators in the country. It can
and does seek to improve the arbitration process through its educational, research, and other activities, but for it to offer parties,
through some constituent group of members, the function of review of the decisions rendered by their arbitrator would be foreign
to its purposes and, as a practical matter, inconceivable. This would
be like asking a bar association or the American Medical Association to establish a "tribunal" to review the "merits" of a professional opinion rendered by one of its members as distinguished
from questions of ethics.
Another suggestion is that the appointing or designating agencies (The Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service, The American Arbitration Association, and state agencies having similar
functions) establish review procedures. This again must be dismissed as an unlikely solution, although for somewhat different
reasons. These agencies, like the Academy, are concerned with
the quality of the arbitration process, but their primary responsibility is to provide the parties with the names of prospective arbitrators. By virtue of the fact that they do provide an appointment
service, however, they have an opportunity not open to the Academy to provide the parties with whom they deal a means of obtaining arbitral review either by the agency itself or by some appellate
tribunal of arbitrators established by the agency. We seriously
question whether review of the merits of a decision by the appointing agency would be acceptable to most parties, or, for that matter,
to the agency. On the other hand, review by a tribunal established
by the agency, or under ad hoc procedures developed by the
agency, could be an additional service offered. Utilization of any
such review procedure would have to be based upon a mutual
consent, voluntary basis, although parties obviously could agree
in advance that the procedure would be available. If an agency
were to make review by such a tribunal a condition on the availability of the agency's services, it would probably be taking a big
step toward going out of business altogether.
There are other ways, however, to obtain arbitral review,
short of going to the courts. One method is for the arbitrator himself to provide for such review even though he is functioning
promote the study and understanding of the arbitration of industrial disputes; to encourage friendly association among the members of the profession; to cooperate with
other organizations, institutions, and learned societies interested in industrial relations;
and to do any and all things which shall be appropriate in the furtherance of these
purposes."
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under a standard arbitration provision. Under orthodox arbitration law the "jurisdiction" of the arbitrator terminates with the
rendering of the award. There may be ways around this problem,
however. One, suggested by Professor (and Arbitrator) Edgar A.
Jones, is to include in the award a provision delaying its finality
for a specific period during which either party may file a request
for rehearing or reconsideration, state the basis for such request,
and serve notice of such request upon the other party, who will
then have the opportunity to reply. 13 Jurisdiction would be "retained" to entertain any such request, and to reconsider or rehear
the matter. A less formal method of providing this kind of opportunity would be for the arbitrator, on his own motion, to send to
the parties a draft of the "proposed" decision and opinion. This
procedure was suggested for possible consideration by Sylvester
Garrett in his presidential address at the 1964 Annual Meeting of
the National Academy of Arbitrators. 14
Another obvious way to obtain review is for the parties to
establish their own appellate system. So far as we are aware, the
instances of this are few, but they are noteworthy partially because
of their variant characteristics. One type of procedure is to be
found in the newspaper industry. Under many agreements in the
industry involving the Pressmen's Union, an arbitration decision
made by an arbitrator selected by the immediate parties to the
dispute may be appealed to an International Board of Arbitration
consisting of three members of the Board of Directors of the Pressmen's Union, three members of the Special Standing Committee
of the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) and
a seventh or "neutral" member chosen from a pre-selected panel
of ten impartial arbitrators. The suggested standard contract language providing for appeals is in broad terms, and there are no
specified grounds for appeal. Despite this fact, our information is
that appeals are infrequent.15
Another and quite different approach is represented in the
agreements between Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company and
its various UAW locals. Although there is no "master agreement,"
the local agreements contain uniform arbitration provisions, which
give either party the right "to request the Impartial Referee to
reconsider his decision or any part thereof or rehear any issue
13
14

15

Jones, Arbitration and the Dilemma of Possible Error, 11 LAB. L.J. 1023 (1960).
This address will appear in the published Proceedings of the meeting.
See Appendix infra.
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involved." The procedures to be followed are carefully spelled
out and include the specification of time limits applicable both
to the parties and to the Referee. 16 As in the Pressmen's-ANPA
case, the contracts do not specify the standards to be used by the
Referee in determining whether or not to grant a request to
reconsider or rehear. Although requests for review have been infrequent, there have been reversals or modifications of original rulings in a few cases despite the psychological and practical difficulties which presumably would make the Referee reluctant to reach
this result. It should be mentioned, however, that the Allis-Chalmers contracts, and in general practice under them, anticipate the
use of "permanent" (in the usual sense) arbitrators, and this may
be a factor of some significance in appraising the utility of the procedure.
These various possibilities for obtaining arbitral review merit
serious consideration. The procedure suggested by Professor Jones
possibly involves the objection that the arbitrator has exceeded his
authority under the contract, although probably not fatally so in
view of the implications of the Warrior & Gulf trilogy. Moreover,
we question the wisdom of introducing any such procedural device, or the less formal equivalent suggested by Arbitrator Garrett,
without an advance understanding with the parties that the procedure will or may be used. The parties' interest in shaping their
arbitration procedure seems to argue that they should not be taken
by surprise in respect to a matter as important as this, especially
since most parties expect the arbitrator's initial decision to be
final. Mr. Garrett recognized that the utility and viability of his
The Allis-Chalmers-UAW contracts provide:
"IO. Either party shall have the right to request the Impartial Referee to reconsider his decision or any part thereof or rehear any issue involved, subject to the
following:
"a. The requesting party shall send its written request to the Impartial Referee
and the other party as promptly as possible but in no event later than 48 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays) following receipt of the Impartial Referee's
decision, and
"b. The requesting party shall send its brief in support of its request to the Impartial Referee and the other party within seven (7) calendar days of the receipt of
the decision.
"The other party shall have five (5) days to file any objections to the request, with
a copy to the other party. No further documents may be filed except at the request of
the Referee. The Referee shall decide within seven (7) calendar days whether or not
to reconsider or rehear, and such decision shall be final and binding.
"11. If the Referee's decision is to rehear, such rehearing shall be given priority
over other pending matters and shall be held promptly. The decision shall be issued
within thirty (30) days following any such rehearing. Such decision shall be final and
binding.''
16
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suggested procedure may depend on the arbitrator's relationship
with the parties, and that the opportunities for its use are obviously better in the "permanent" than in the ad hoc situation.
It would seem that a case can be made for some kind of review
procedure within the arbitration process, although we believe it
should be one worked out by the parties, not compelled by the
arbitrator. Arbitrators occasionally do make mistakes, however experienced and conscientious they may be, and the best interests of
the parties and of the arbitration process may well be served by
. making provision for their correction. Of the various possible
procedures available for this purpose, it seems that one which
would give the original arbitrator the opportunity to review his
own decision is preferable to independent review by an "appellate" arbitrator or arbitrators. The latter is likely to involve more
time and expense than the former, and we doubt that the over-all
results would be any better. The original arbitrator, assuming
(as we must) his basic honesty, integrity, competence, and conscientiousness, will very likely have the capacity to be persuaded
that he has erred, if there are proper grounds for a claim of serious
error, and he will have the courage to admit his error. Indeed, it
seems to us that he is the one who should have the initial opportunity to make the assessment. 17
The scope of the "review," however established, is a difficult
substantive problem. We doubt, for example, that it should be
available to enable a party to present new evidence or to change
his theory of the case. Slothfulness in the initial preparation and
presentation should not be encouraged. But experience with a
review procedure will provide the necessary basis for judgment
concerning the criteria for reviewability which should be developed by the arbitrator or prescribed by the parties. A priori doctrinaire positions should be avoided at this juncture, tempting
though they may be.
To conclude on the subject of "review" of arbitration decisions, we repeat that this seems to be a matter of genuine and
17 One of us (Smith) for some years has served as Impartial Referee under some of
the Allis-Chalmers-UAW agreements, and has been confronted from time to time with
requests for reconsideration or rehearing. although such requests have been infrequent.
Some have been denied; others granted. On one occasion the Referee granted the request, in this instance by the Company, on the basis that he had misread part of the
testimony appearing in the transcript of the hearing, and that this fact may have been
a material factor in the analysis of the case. The ultimate result was a reversal of the
earlier decision. The Referee in this instance, although understandably embarrassed,
appreciated the opportunity to review his findings of fact and determination.
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understandable concern to many who basically believe in arbitration. We think there is room for constructive experimentation in
this area provided the review procedures are kept out of the courts,
except to the extent now available, and provided review is structured within the arbitration process itself. We believe this is a matter which could properly be on the collective bargaining agenda.

2. Procedural Matters
Many of our respondents' criticisms are directed at alleged
procedural deficiencies. There appears to be general agreement
that the arbitrator should control the hearing, conduct it in an
orderly fashion, and not "let it get out of hand." Too often, it is
said, the arbitrator allows the hearing to degenerate into a formless discussion that strays from the issue and precludes an orderly
presentation of the case. One management representative comments:
"Many of the arbitration cases in which I have participated have been unnecessarily lengthened and greatly confused
by the unwillingness of the arbitrator to really act as a hearing officer in control of his own hearing. While there is no
need to develop the judicial attitude of a Federal judge, it
would be of immense help to raise the arbitration hearing
above the level of a bar room brawl."
Somewhat related is the view, expressed frequently by our respondents, especially lawyers, that there should be more extensive use
of the "rules of evidence." A union attorney stated:
"My most important concern is that arbitrators pay closer
attention to procedural due process. I will predict that in the
near future, a new line of court attack on arbitration rulings
will commence on procedural due process grounds unless arbitrators pay greater attention to these requirements. For example, some arbitrators seem to consider that rules of evidence
are useless technicalities to be scorned by broad-thinking men.
They forget that rules of evidence are usually based upon
rules of reason and if they continue to admit hearsay, wholly
irrelevant matters, and similar oddities, there will be difficulty
ahead . . . . It is my personal belief that an arbitrator who
pays closer attention to procedural due process, including
reasonable rules of evidence, is more likely to reach a correct
result."
On the other hand, there are those, including some who advocate more formal procedures and greater reliance on the rules of
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evidence, who object that the arbitration process is becoming too
"legalistic." The following comment is illustrative:
"I am of the opinion that arbitration is becoming too
legalistic. Originally, arbitration was designed for laymen to
settle promptly disputes that arise between the company and
the union. Now it appears that arbitration is being too heavily
influenced by precedent and court procedures, and engaged
in, in my opinion, to an unhealthy extent by the legal profession."
Another criticism of some intensity concerns the use of posthearing briefs. Some feel that "briefs . . . should not be proliferated, especially on request of the arbitrator, except in cases
which are unusually technical or complex." Complaints about
the use of briefs stem in large part from the desire to minimize
delays and costs. There is also, however, some feeling that on
occasions arbitrators improperly use briefs as "crutches." As one
respondent remarks, "there are some arbitrators who make use of
briefs as an escape hatch so that the decision consists of the briefs
of the respective parties quoted in 'full' [in lieu, we suppose, of
the arbitrator's own summary and analysis of the evidence and
arguments] and the award."
In the general area of arbitration procedure there exists not
only a wide range of opinion, but also, we suspect, some confusion
of thought about the meaning of terms such as "legalisms," "legalistic," and "rules of evidence." We doubt that there are many
clearly validated principles in relation to such matters, including the extent to which the arbitrator, as distinguished from the
parties, should assume the basic responsibility for procedural matters. Moreover, there is probably no real consensus on most of
these procedural problems among the arbitrators themselves, except perhaps the view that there is no virtue in consistency and
uniformity, and that the parties, subject to some limitations, "can
have it the way they want it." Most persons concerned with the
process would probably find their greatest area of agreement on
the point that the arbitrator has a responsibility for keeping the
proceeding under control. But even this is subject to the qualification that the parties sometimes have their own, mutually acceptable notions of procedure, to which the arbitrator may properly
be inclined to defer.
In general, complaints about the looseness of arbitration proceedings in the matter of presentation of evidence are probably
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factually sound. It is our impression that arbitrators do not, as a
rule, strictly apply the "rules of evidence," if they apply them at
all. This is doubtless due in part to the fact that many arbitrators
and party representatives are not lawyers, but even more to the
belief that strict adherence to these rules is inappropriate and unnecessary in an arbitration proceeding. The result in many instances undoubtedly is the burdening of the "record" with much
"hearsay" testimony and documentary evidence of questionable
probative value. In some cases the receipt of this questionable
evidence prolongs the hearing, but in most cases the actual result
is probably otherwise, since strict application of the rules of evidence would put parties to the necessity of producing more validating testimony and witnesses who may not be readily available,
and would involve the hearing in much time-consuming squabbling
over the "admissibility," "materiality," and "competence" of proffered evidence.
We believe there is no clearly defined road map to direct the
parties or the arbitrator in the handling of these evidentiary
problems. Here again the arbitrator may find that the parties
have established their own procedures, which occasionally indicate
complete rejection of orthodox notions concerning the presentation of evidence.18 Laying aside such situations, however, in which
18 For many years the Chrysler-UAW "appeal board" procedure involved no presentation of oral testimony at the "Impartial Chairman" level, and, indeed, no opportunity for the Impartial Chairman (the arbitrator) even to view the plant premises, machine, etc., involved in the case. The evidence consisted entirely of written statements
signed by persons claiming to have knowledge of the relevant facts, and of the prearbitration written presentations of the parties. This procedure was reviewed by David
A. Wolff, for many years the Umpire, and by Louis A. Crane and Howard A. Cole, who
have been associated with Mr. Wolff in Wolff, Crane&: Cole, The Chrysler-UAW Umpire
System, THE ArulITRATOR AND THE PARTIES lll (BNA 1958). On the "appellate" nature of
the procedure the authors stated:
"The appeal board believes such statements to be generally as, or more, reliable
than oral accounts, under oath or otherwise, given in the excitement, and under the
circumstances, of direct discussion. Although on occasion the actual presence and
participation of witnesses might be of some help where credibility is a factor, almost
always the type of proof called for and submitted is more than adequate to enable
an accurate determination of the truth. Further, the 'closed' session rule encourages
discussions which are frank and to the point, avoids conditions which might lead
to the rekindling of old fires, and, it is believed, serves to provide, over-all, more
effective and expeditious presentations as well as better relations between the parties."
Id. at 125.
These views, if accurate, must come as something of a surprise to lawyers and others
familiar with customary judicial procedures. It is interesting that in 196!1 the procedure
described above was modified, so that now the Chrysler "Umpire" hearings involve the
presentation of evidence in the manner customary in most arbitration proceedings.
The current Bendix Corporation-UAW Master Agreement expressly forbids the presentation of witnesses at an Umpire hearing. As a result, the evidence presented at hearings resembles that which earlier characterized the Chrysler hearings, with the exception
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the arbitrator may or may not feel comfortable, we think the
answer lies not in a formula of strict adherence to the so-called
"rules of evidence" (which present their own special problems
and are less rigid and mechanical than might be supposed even
in court proceedings), but rather in an increased awareness that
some kinds of evidence are more trustworthy than others, that the
opposing party has a natural interest in minimizing the possible
impact of evidence which he considers untrustworthy or irrelevant, and that a party has the responsibility of doing his home
work prior to the hearing and making the best case he can.
One of the difficulties in discussing the "rules of evidence" lies
in the failure to distinguish between the rules relating to relevancy
and materiality and the rules relating to admissibility (e.g., concerning "hearsay" testimony or records which are not properly
authenticated). The looseness of the arbitrator in being willing to
listen ad nauseam to testimony alleged to be completely irrelevant
is sometimes due to his inability, at least until the hearing is well
along, to determine precisely what the issue is. Stipulations of the
issue are rare, and very often the claims made are so vague or so
broad that questions of relevancy and materiality simply cannot be
decided at the time the proffer of evidence is made. We agree,
however, that in this area arbitrators are fairly subject to some
criticism. Too often, we fear, the answer, "I'll accept it for what
it's worth," or ''I'll determine its relevancy later," places an unfair
burden on the opposing party who should not ordinarily be compelled to defend himself against an improper line of attack or
array of evidence. Perhaps the arbitrator should spend whatever
time is necessary at the outset of the hearing, within reasonable
limits (and limits there are!) in an attempt to determine precisely
what the issues are (at least to his satisfaction), and thus place
himself in a position to exclude matters which are clearly irrelevant or immaterial. One need not be a lawyer to make rulings of
this nature. At the same time, it must be recognized that arbitration procedures are highly variable, and the extent to which the
arbitrator may invoke rules of exclusion may depend upon the
degree of sophistication and the expectations of the parties as well
as his or their conception of the function of arbitration. 19
that it appears to be understood that the Company and Union representatives who are
entitled to be present at the hearings are likewise entitled, almost as if they were ordinary witnesses, to present statements of pertinent facts alleged to be within their personal
knowledge or otherwise known to them.
19

The late Dean Shulman, in one of the most significant of the many analyses of
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A brief comment on the use of briefs may be in order. There
are probably few arbitrators who would not agree that in the
complex case, especially where there is no transcript, a brief can
be of great value. A brief also has special utility in those instances
in which the parties have not made adequate presentations at the
hearing, although the parties should not be tempted in such cases
to use the brief as a substitute for evidence. We believe that good
briefs are usually helpful to the arbitrator and may, in fact, reduce
the amount of required "study" time, thus expediting the decisional process. We use the term "good" advisedly, because too often
briefs are so poor as to be worthless. In view of the criticisms expressed by our respondents, it seems apparent that the arbitrator
should use caution in asking for briefs when the parties seem
reluctant to supply them. But it must be remembered that he has
the burden and responsibility of deciding the case, and should not
hesitate to ask for briefs when he feels they are needed. Nor may he
properly deny a party the opportunity to file a brief.
One device which profitably could be used more widely is a
pre-hearing brief or statement by each party, containing the party's
version of the issues and the facts, for presentation at the hearing.
This procedure is used under the General Motors-UAW umpire
system, and our understanding is that both parties consider it
useful. In our own experience we have found such statements to
be useful. It occurs to us that if pre-hearing statements are to be
prepared, the parties might consider exchanging them prior to the
hearing, and might even send them to the arbitrator, so that positions will be known and, perhaps, a better basis will be established
for stipulating facts and thus reducing hearing time.20
labor dispute arbitration, even suggested that rigid rules of exclusion may unduly restrict
the information gathering function of the hearing. See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and
Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999, 1017 (1955), in which he stated:
"The more serious danger is not that the arbitrator will hear too much irrelevancy,
but rather that he will not hear enough of the relevant. Indeed, one advantage fre•
quently reaped from wide latitude to the parties to talk about their case is that the
apparent rambling frequently discloses very helpful information which would otherwise
not be brought out. Rules of procedure which assure adequate opportunity to each party
to prepare for and meet the other's contentions, or rules designed to encourage full
consideration and effort at adjustment in the prior stages of the grievance procedure
may be quite desirable. But they should not be such as to prevent full presentation of
the controversy to the arbitrator before he is required to make final decision. For that
would not only limit his resources for sound judgment, but would tend also to create
dissatisfaction with the system."
20 We recognize that some will object to this procedure on the ground that it may
induce the arbitrator to decide the case before he hears it. We will simply state that in
our judgment this view lacks merit.

1132

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

62

Another technique which might be used with profit in some
situations, or at least ought to be considered, is something analogous to the pre-trial conference which is commonly used in judicial proceedings. This would involve a preliminary meeting with
the arbitrator, or perhaps with a representative of the appointing
agency (e.g., The American Arbitration Association) if it is involved, in an attempt to resolve any differences which may exist
- concerning the issues to be decided and to stipulate facts insofar as
possible.
To conclude on the matter of arbitration procedure, our survey indicates some degree of dissatisfaction with the present state
of affairs. We think some of it is justified, and that there is room
for improvement. Yet, it is our view that the arbitrator may have
even more basis of complaint than the parties. He often faces the
difficult tasks of making some "record" of the proceeding without
the assistance of a reporter, trying to ascertain the real issues where
there has been inadequate preparation by one side or the other
(and wondering whether and how to obtain facts which are lacking), sifting the chaff from the wheat in what has been presented,
and, withal, maintaining some kind of image for the parties that
he is the "impartial judge" of their dispute. We see need for a
more thorough examination of the question of the arbitrator's
role and responsibilities, not excluding those situations in which
the parties seem to feel that the entire matter of procedure is theirs
to decide, if they can agree. We frankly think that more can be
learned from the arbitrators than from the parties on the problems
of procedure encountered in arbitration, and that the arbitrators
should assume a greater responsibility than they have in the past
in indicating their views and suggesting needed improvements.
3. The Appointing Agencies and Their Responsibilities-

The Development of "New" Arbitrators
From a substantial number of our respondents come criticisms
of the appointing agencies, which are principally The Federal
Mediation & Conciliation Service and The American Arbitration
Association. The following types of complaints are most frequent:
(I) The agencies are not sufficiently selective in placing individuals on their rosters of available arbitrators (and the corollary
proposition that only "qualified" people should be included);
(2) the names of the same arbitrators appear too frequently on
the lists or "panels" sent to the parties; (3) insufficient information

1964]

LABOR ARBITRATION

1133

is supplied to the parties about the people included on the panels;
and (4) the agencies at times improperly include the name of an
"objectionable" arbitrator upon a panel list.
The criticism of insufficient selectivity on the part of the
agencies in adding names of potential arbitrators to their rosters
is accompanied very often by the claim that there is a pressing
need for developing a greater supply of competent, experienced
arbitrators. 21 Obviously, the agencies and the parties face the dilemma that the supply of competent, experienced arbitrators cannot be increased except by the development of new arbitrators;
and the new arbitrators cannot become "experienced" except as
they are used by the parties.
The problem of increasing the supply of competent and "acceptable" arbitrators is not easy to solve. A substantial portion of
our current crop are alumni of the War Labor Board (of World
War II) or the Wage Stabilization Board (of the Korean War).
Not only did their governmental experience bring them into
active contact with management and labor representatives, but,
since they received governmental appointments as "neutrals,"
they acquired a basis for subsequent acceptability as arbitrators
when their government service ended. But this group of arbitrators is limited in number and often so busy as to make them unavailable except to their regular client_ele. A new world crisis,
which would require us again to establish a tripartite apparatus
for labor dispute resolution, would be the most obvious (but
clearly unwelcome) way to provide new talent for the arbitration
field. We must find other methods of meeting the problem.
The appointing (designating) agencies have the greatest opportunity and perhaps the major responsibility in this area. The
American Arbitration Association through its regional offices is
constantly attempting to obtain the acceptance by the parties of
inexperienced, but, in the Association's judgment, qualified men.
The Regional Manager, by virtue of his personal contacts with
the parties in his region, is frequently able to persuade them to
"try out" a new man. This process has had considerable success
in bringing new arbitrators into the field. 22 The Association does
21 This suggestion, in fact, is the one most frequently advanced by our respondents,
both management and union.
22 During the period 1956-1958, inclusive, 149 arbitrators listed on the Association's
national labor dispute arbitration roster received their initial appointments in cases.
During the period 1959-1961, inclusive, the figure was 124. Most of these individuals
were actually added to the AAA panel prior to the respective three-year periods. The
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not require prior arbitration experience as a prerequisite for
inclusion of an individual on its national panel or roster of labor
dispute arbitrators. However, endorsements from labor and management representatives are required, and, in addition, the Association's Regional Manager usually makes an independent local
"check" of the individual's repute in the labor-management community.
The regulations of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service state that it will not add a name to its roster unless the individual has had "experience in the labor arbitration field or its equivalent."23 We are informed that, while the Service lays considerable
stress upon actual arbitration experience, it gives a liberal interpretation to the term "equivalent," and that actual prior arbitration experience is not, in fact, a prerequisite for the inclusion on
the roster.24 It is appropriate, we think, to note that the information which we are reporting concerning the internal operations of
number of persons added to the Association's national panel was 51 in 1959, 61 in 1960,
and 56 in 1961. A majority of these had had no previous actual arbitration experience,
although a good many had had previous labor relations experience with the government
or in other capacities. Some of these persons were selected by parties in the year of
their appointment; others, subsequently. (Information supplied by Joseph Murphy, VicePresident of the American Arbitration Association.)

23

The Regulations of the Service provide as follows:
"It is the policy of the Service to maintain on its roster only those arbitrators who
are experienced, qualified, and acceptable, and who adhere to ethical standards. Applicants for inclusion on its roster must not only be well-grounded in the field of labormanagement relations, but, also, possess experience in the labor arbitration field or its
equivalent. (Arbitrators employed full time as representatives of management or labor
are not included on the Service's roster.) After a careful screening and evaluation of the
applicant's experience, the Service contacts representatives of both labor and management, as qualified arbitrators must be acceptable to those who utilize its arbitration fa.
cilities. The responses to such inquiries are carefully weighed before an otherwise qualified arbitrator is included on the Service's roster." 29 C.F.R. § 1404.2 (1963).
24 During the period March 1, 1961, through December 31, 1963, the Service added
168 names to its roster. (The total number on its roster now is approximately 850.)
Approximately 120 of the persons added during this period had no, or very limited,
previous arbitration experience. Of those without any previous arbitration experience,
33 have acquired varying degrees of acceptability, having been selected by parties in one
or more cases. During this period the Service issued to parties a total of 12,025 "panels"
(suggested lists of arbitrators from whom the selections could be made for particular
cases). Of these panels 4,097 included some one of the 168 individuals whose names were
added to the Service's roster during the period, and these submissions resulted in a total
of 271 selections of some one of such persons in individual cases. The names of the 33
inexperienced arbitrators who were selected in one or more cases were submitted on 1,774
of the panels sent out during the period, and such individuals were selected in 136 cases.
A cursory examination of the biographical information available on the 168 arbitra•
tors added to the Service's roster during this period shows that a substantial proportion
are lawyers, and that of the 33 inexperienced arbitrators who developed some acceptibility,
a very large proportion are practicing attorneys. (The foregoing information was sup•
plied to us in conferences with H. T. Herrick, Jr., General Counsel of the Service.)
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FMCS is based upon policies of the Service as administered un~er
its present director, William E. Simkin. It is common knowledge
that the Service's policies and methods of operation have varied
over the years, due principally to differences in attitude and approach of the particular director.
Whether the agencies have adequate standards for pre-judgment of the individual's basic qualifications we are not prepared
to say. In view of some of the criticisms we have received, it may
be that they should be more careful than they are in adding
names to their rosters. In any event, we think the procedures used
by the agencies in adding new names should be given greater
publicity, and subjected to constructive appraisal by all concerned.
We think the agencies should include an assessment of potential
acceptability among factors considered in determining whether or
not to add a name to its roster, but they should be concerned primarily with basic competence, and attempt to deal with the matter
of acceptability by affirmative measures designed to introduce the
new man to the labor-management community.25 Appraisals of the
individual by labor and management representatives in the community are relevant considerations in the determination of his probable
acceptability, but we doubt that any prior labor-management endorsement should be an indispensable prerequisite. Instead, the
agency should concentrate on methods for judging potential competence and let these be the principal bases for the additions of
new names.
But it scarcely needs to be stated that it is difficult to prescribe
a set of educational and other standards as the sine qua non for
prediction of success as an arbitrator. Possibly some guidance is
available in an analysis of the kinds of educational and other
25 When the FMCS receives an application for addition to its national roster or
"panel" of arbitrators, it requests the applicant to fill out a questionnaire giving details
of his past experience and background, including previous arbitration and labor relations
experience. If a review of the questionnaire shows a sufficient labor relations or arbitra•
tion background to suggest that the applicant may be qualified to serve as an arbitrator,
the Service further investigates the applicant's background through what is called a Regional Director's "check." The Regional Director, or a field mediator acting under his
supervision, interviews all references whose names are submitted by the applicant. In
addition, persons active in the labor-management communities of the geographic areas
in which the applicant has acquired his labor relations or arbitration experience are
interviewed for the purpose, among other things, of ascertaining whether the applicant
is deemed "acceptable." The Regional Director's reports on these interviews are given
great weight by the Director of the Service when considering an applicant who has had
little or no previous arbitration experience. (This information was supplied to us in
conference with H. T. Herrick, Jr., General Counsel of the Service.)
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backgrounds possessed by experienced arbitrators. The most obvious group available for this kind of study is the membership of
the National Academy of Arbitrators, concerning whom the Academy itself has recently released some factual studies. But even if
such criteria do become available, actual competence can be determined only through experience. At this point, the parties must
assume some responsibility.
We can understand the natural reluctance of the parties to
try out a new arbitrator, but it may be that they will have more
confidence in using inexperienced men if they are more certain of
their general qualifications. Providing the parties with the opportunity to appraise the agencies' qualification standards, as we have
suggested, may be a step in this direction. In addition, the agencies
could do more in publicizing the qualifications of its panel members, perhaps by publishing a directory of arbitrators and sending
out flyers when new names are added.26 The FMCS might also
consider the possibility of decentralizing its service, at least in some
respects, to its regional offices in order to facilitate the opportunity
for the personal contacts with the parties.27
The two major appointing agencies, with the active support
and assistance of the National Academy of Arbitrators, have recently undertaken unique types of arbitrator training programs
designed to meet the dual problems of the "new" arbitrator-lack
of experience and lack of "acceptability." The first such program
was begun in the Chicago area in September 1962. Fourteen
"trainees," mostly from the academic community, were selected
by the appointing agencies. After a one-day "training institute,"
the trainees were assigned to arbitrators in the area, all of whom
26 FMCS General Counsel Herrick informs us that the Service has never published
a complete directory of arbitrators listed on its national panel. In his view, the reluctance of the Service to issue such a directory is based primarily upon the administrative
inconvenience and cost of maintaining an up-to-date directory, but partly on lack of
evidence of any significant demand by the parties for such a directory. He points out
that the list of "available" arbitrators changes constantly, for reasons ranging from the
arbitrator's inability to take cases at any given time because of other commitments, to
excessive delay in rendering awards or to disagreements with the Service as to fee policies.
21 FMCS General Counsel Herrick feels that it would not be desirable for the Service
to decentralize its panel selection process, which is now performed by a very small staff
in Washington. Centralized administration, he believes, has resulted in great flexibility,
particularly in meeting local needs by submission of the names of arbitrators from distant
areas, where this is indicated, and by finding arbitrators with an expertise fitted to particular types of cases. In addition, he considers that centralized administration permits
the Service to use top level judgment in the selection process. Finally, he states that
while the Service is criticized from time to time by parties dissatisfied with particular
panels, it has never encountered substantial criticism or significant administrative difficulties which could be attributed to centralized administration.
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are members of the Academy, and whose cooperation was volunteered. Each trainee attended at least one hearing, in each instance
with the acquiescence of the parties involved. The program contemplated that the "apprentice" arbitrators would prepare their
own analyses of the cases heard and draft opinions and awards,
which were to be scrutinized and criticized by the "journeyman"
arbitrator after he had rendered his decision. The program was
continued until August 1963. Judged in terms of the extent to
which the trainees gained actual acceptability in cases of their
own up to December 15, 1963, the program was not very successful. But it is perhaps too early to form a judgment on this basis.
Meanwhile, the appointing agencies have decided to initiate arbitrator training programs in two other areas, Northern Ohio and
Pittsburgh. The latter is under way, and an attempt is being made
to improve on the methods followed in the Chicago pilot program.2s
One other established and sound method of developing new
acceptable and experienced arbitrators is through what amounts to
an apprenticeship with a busy, full-time arbitrator. A relatively
small number of younger men have been brought into the field
in this manner through the good offices of some of the most eminent of our veteran arbitrators.29 This process is continuing. The
difficulty, of course, is that the number of available apprenticeships
fails by a considerable margin to provide enough new "journeymen." If the time ever arrives when there are firms of arbitrators,
as there are in other professional fields, the opportunity for developing arbitrators through "clerkships" will be greatly enhanced.
Certain criticisms we have received of the appointing agencies
do not seem serious or merited. The fact that the same names
appear too frequently on the lists sent to the parties is in part due
to the lack of acceptable and available arbitrators, which is especially acute in some areas of the country, and to the practice of
28 The NAA Committee on the Training of New Arbitrators, consisting of Chairman
Pearce Davis, Thomas J. McDermott and Joseph G. Stashower, made a comprehensive
report and evaluation on these programs at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the Academy.
This report will appear in the ·published Proceedings of the Academy.
29 The Board of Governors of the NAA authorized a survey of arbitrators and arbitration for the calendar year 1962. An extensive questionnaire was prepared by a special
committee of the Academy consisting of Chairman Irving Bernstein, William Gomberg,
Richard Mittenthal, Frank C. Pierson and Arthur M. Ross, and was mailed to each
member of the Academy. Some 175 responses were received. Of those responding, 19
(10.9%) had served some kind of "arbitration apprenticeship" of an average duration
of 2.6 years. The Committee's report was made at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the Academy, and will appear as part of the published Proceedings.
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both agencies of utilizing arbitrators within the area of the dispute
unless the parties specify otherwise. The basic reason for the latter
is to minimize "travel" costs. If the parties so desire, either agency
will provide, upon request, the names of arbitrators in other regions. A difficult problem arises, however, when one party desires
to use an outside arbitrator, and the other does not. When the
parties cannot agree on an arbitrator, the agency may be forced
to make an administrative appointment which may leave both
parties dissatisfied. This is the type of problem which the parties
themselves should resolve, but their failure to do so should not
result in criticism of the appointing agency.
Both agencies attempt to provide the parties with lists of arbitrators, who, the agencies believe, can competently deal with the
dispute. There is, however, no automatic rotation of names on the
entire roster. When a request for a panel is received, the type of
dispute is noted, and panel selections are then made based upon
the agency's evaluation of the experience and capacity required
to deal with the issue. The actual selection of panel names is made
under AAA procedures by the Tribunal Clerk under the supervision of the Regional Manager, and under FMCS procedures by
the General Counsel. All direct designations are made by the Director of the Service. Obviously, much depends upon the judgment
of those who make up the lists. Certainly this is an important
aspect of each agency's work, and one which should be kept under
constant care and continuous scrutiny within the agency.
The agencies do not include on a panel the name of an arbitrator known to be objectionable to one or both of the parties. In
selecting arbitrators for panels, FMCS reviews panels which have
been submitted in current cases involving the same parties, and it
avoids, wherever possible, listing any arbitrator who is on an outstanding current panel for the same parties. The AAA follows
somewhat similar procedures. Each agency reviews selections
which have been made by the parties in previous cases, and attempts to name people whose acceptability has been demonstrated.
A name will routinely be included on a panel if both parties request this, but not upon the request of one party alone. If an objection is made to the listing of a particular arbitrator, the AAA
attempts to determine the basis of the objection, and, if possible,
to resolve the problem.
It should also be noted, with regard to another criticism made
by some respondents, that the agencies do review the qualifications
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of arbitrators. AAA regional managers maintain records pertaining to an individual's acceptability. The Regional Manager also
reviews the arbitrator's opinion and award and the Tribunal
Clerk's appraisal of the manner in which the arbitrator conducted
the hearing. The time between the close of the hearing and the
issuing of the award is noted along with the fee charged, and all
of this information is recorded on an arbitrator's Service Record
Card. When an objection is made regarding an arbitrator's performance, the New York office reviews this information and makes
its own appraisal. The FMCS has a similar although less formalized
procedure. It can be assumed that each agency on occasion utilizes
its appraisals to remove an arbitrator from its roster if such action
is deemed warranted, although this is probably an infrequent occurrence. When it does happen, the individual obviously should
be apprised of the action and given an opportunity to persuade
the agency that its judgment is wrong. 30
It seems to us, on the whole, that the agencies are providing a
helpful and much needed service in connection with the development of rosters of competent and experienced arbitrators, and in
providing a procedure to which the parties may resort for the
selection of an arbitrator. The quality of the agencies' work seems
to be doubted by many of our respondents, possibly in some cases
for lack of information concerning the internal operations of the
agencies, and in others because of dissatisfaction with some arbitrator obtained through the procedures of the agency. It is obvious
that any agency which assumes the role of developing and screening rosters of potential arbitrators and of culling names from this
roster to submit for consideration in a particular case has a serious
responsibility not only to the parties but to the arbitrators. It is
equally obvious that the quality of the work of the agency will
depend to a substantial degree upon the competence and good
judgment of the personnel who administer the program on a dayto-day basis, as well as on the general policy standards established
by the agency's "top command." Some of our respondents think
that there are, or have been, deficiencies in these respects.
We do not know to what extent these criticisms are justified. A
so We wish to thank Robert Coulson, Executive Vice-President of the American Arbitration Association, Herbert Schmertz, former General Counsel of the Federal Mediation
&: Conciliation Service, H. T. Herrick, Jr., present General Counsel, and Mrs. L. P. Herrscher, Manager Detroit Region, American Arbitration Association for their cooperation
in providing us information concerning the procedures and practices followed by the
respective agencies, and for their helpful comments.
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careful evaluation would require much more information than we
now have concerning the quality of the personnel of the agencies
and their operating procedure. One of the problems facing the
agencies in dealing with their potential clientele is the aura of the
"mystique" in which, perhaps of necessity, they operate.

4. Delays in Awards
Our respondents generally complain about delay in the receipt
of arbitration decisions. Since one of the presumed virtues of the
arbitration process is the speedy determination of cases, this complaint deserves serious consideration.
How much time is taken by arbitrators in deciding cases? It is
common knowledge that this varies with the case and, to some
degree, with the arbitrator; the extent of the arbitrator's caseload
necessarily is one of the relevant factors. Fortunately, as a result of
the recent National Academy of Arbitrators survey of its membership there are some interesting statistical data available.31
The 158 arbitrators who responded to the Academy's questionnaire issued a total of 6,045 decisions in contract grievance cases
during 1962. Reports on elapsed time between date of final submission and issuance of award were submitted for 5,422 of these
cases, and the tabular summary is as follows:
DAYS

1-15
16-30
31-60
61-90
Over 90

NUMBER OF CASES

PERCENT OF TOTAL

1,386
2,666
864
234
272

25.6
49.2
15.9
4.3
5.0

We think these data suggest that the complaints about delays
may be exaggerated. Awards are issued in some seventy-five percent of the cases within thii:,ty days of the close of the hearing or
the submission of briefs-a time period which is reasonable despite
some complaints. It would appear that it is the ten percent of
cases taking over sixty days which evoke the most justified criticism.
The FMCS and AAA attempt to meet the problem of excessive delay in issuing awards by requiring that an arbitrator selected
under their procedures render his award within thirty days after
the case is heard and any post-hearing briefs are filed. How faith31

See note 29 supra.
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fully arbitrators observe these requirements we do-not know. Presumably, in most cases the time limit is met. However, there are
doubtless many instances in which the arbitrator requests and
receives from the parties an extension of time, and there may even
be instances of deliberate ignoring of time limits. When the latter
occurs, there seems to be no effective sanction available to the
parties other than complaint to the agency. There is the possibility,
however, that the award could be subjected to legal attack on the
theory that the parties and the arbitrator, by virtue of their use of
the appointing agency, have impliedly agreed that the agency's
rule or policy concerning time limitations shall be observed. Time
limitations upon the rendering of awards are sometimes written
into the arbitration provision of the contract, and failure of an
arbitrator to meet the requirement in the absence of a waiver by
the parties could produce a legal question concerning its validity
(a question which we will examine on another occasion). Occasionally these contractual time limits are highly unrealistic, especially under "umpire" systems where the arbitrator may typically hear a "docket" of cases in one hearing session, and cannot
as a practical matter comply with the stipulated time limitation,
if his awards must be supported by opinions.
Finally, we suggest that the parties may be placing too much
emphasis upon the delays attributable to the arbitrator, important
as this matter may be. We suspect that these delays are minimal
on the whole when contrasted with the time consumed by the
parties themselves in handling grievances through the pre-arbitration steps in the grievance procedure. The "well-aged" grievance
is not an unusual phenomenon.82 Difficulties in setting hearing
dates and postponements of dates frequently occur. There are many
instances in which the parties cause delay by insisting on the filing
of post-hearing briefs when they are not needed, and by delaying
their filings through mutual agreement. What we have is a pervasive problem, attending the entire process of grievance handling,
and the malady should receive a complete clinical examination
rather than one confined to only a part of the anatomy.

5. The Costs of Arbitration
Our survey reveals a substantial amount of criticism, principally
from union sources, concerning arbitrators' fees and the general
costs of arbitration. This complaint is not new, and it appears to
82

See Ross, The Well-Aged Arbitration Case, 11 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 262 (1957-58).
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be increasing-so we are advised by the appointing agencies. One
union has carried its concern to the point of calling together the
arbitrators in the Detroit area for a discussion of the matter.
Any appraisal of this complaint should begin with an inquiry
into the facts. We have n9t undertaken any direct research in the
matter of fees and total costs, but some relevant data are available.
The arbitrator's "per diem" rate has a significant although obviously inconclusive bearing on his total charge. The American
Arbitration Association, in analyzing over 1,000 cases decided in
1954, found that per diem rates "were clustered around the $100
per day mark," and ranged between $25 and $200.38 We are informed by the Association that during 1962 the per diem rates of
arbitrators who handled the bulk of the cases ranged from $100
to $150, and that the average was approximately $125. (The Academy survey, incidentally, reports a 1962 average in grievance cases
of $126 per day.) These data thus show increases in per diem rates
of approximately twenty-five percent for the period 1954 through
1962.
In the 1954 AAA study it was found that the "most common
total fee was within the $200 to $299.99 group," that "the next
most common fell within the $100.00 to $199.00 total fee range"
and that "more than 85% of the total fees were within the $399.99
or less category." Other data compiled by the Association and
made available to us show that arbitrators' fees per case per hearing
day, as shown by an analysis of records of arbitrators who received
more than $1,000 in fees during the year, have increased from
$276.82 in 1958 to $301.06 in 1961, and a slightly higher figure for
part of 1963. These data are not easily evaluated because of the
variables involved, i.e., hearing and study time per comparable
case and per diem rate.
A more meaningful study which takes into account these variables is that recently made by Professor R. W. Fleming, the results
of which were reported at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators.34 His study was based on a random
selection of 100 discharge cases decided in 1951-1952, another 100
decided in 1956-1957, and a third 100 decided in 1962-1963. His
analysis indicates that the average per diem rates were $84 in
1951-1952, $ll0 in 1956-1957, and $129 in 1962-1963, which is
33 PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE .ASPEcrs OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT ARBITRATION

19 (American Arb. Ass'n).
34 Fleming, supra note I.

12-13,
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an increase of fifty-four percent over the period (which, incidentally, he observes "is almost the same as the rise in average hourly
earnings of production workers in manufacturing during the
same period"). His analysis further shows that the average total
fee per case was $277 in 1951-1952 and $402 in 1962-1963-an increase of forty-five percent.
.
It is Fleming's over-all conclusion that even though arbitrators'
fees have increased, they have not done so "to an inordinate degree" in the type of case from which his sample was drawn, and
that his data probably "fairly represent the arbitration picture today . . . if one considers only those kinds of cases to which we
have all grown accustomed over the years, e.g., discipline and
discharge, seniority, job classification, etc." He suggests that "new
and complex issues growing out of the emphasis upon job security
may fall into quite a different pattern."
There is little we can add on the question of the extent to
which fees and total costs (attributable to the arbitrator) have
been increasing beyond what can be inferred from the data reported above. More information is needed. We understand FMCS
is making a study of the matter. It is not doubted that there are
some examples of excessive and extreme over-charging, but the
evidence we have seen does not seem to sustain the claim that arbitrators' charges have increased alarmingly, or disproportionately
as compared with the prices charged for other kinds of services or
with other indices, such as the increase in the cost of living.85
This conclusion, if justified, nevertheless may not be a complete answer to the complaints about arbitrators' fees. Arbitration
historically has had a "public service" aspect, and it may be that
its increased professionalization, of which increased fees may be
some evidence, has tended to indicate a change in the character of
the arbitrator's function, as both he and the parties conceive it.
The parties seem to expect increased competence and "expertise,"
based on experience with increasingly complex types of problems
and, we think, expect more serious attention to the basic issues
involved. Arbitrators may have justifiable reason, therefore, for
thinking their services are worth more than in times past, and it
85 In the first place, the increases in the average per diem rate and in the average
total fee per case are not necessarily accurate reflections of the increase, if any, in average
net income per case because overhead costs and other expenses of arbitrators, especially
those maintaining their own offices, may have increased even more. It is of some interest
that, according to one survey, 38.6% of the 1954 gross income of lawyers was expended
for overhead. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ECONOl\UCS OF LAw PRACrICE SERIES, PAMPHLET No. 1,
THE 1958 LAWYER AND HIS 1938 DoLI..AR 9. In view of the general upward trend in the
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is understandable that they may have a tendency to compare their
services, in terms of qualifications and income levels, with those of
the recognized professions.
Any such standard of evaluation of the fee problem-i.e., looking at arbitration as a profession-probably would require the conclusion that arbitrators are not as a whole overpaid when compared
with other professional groups; indeed, they may be underpaid.
Moreover, again pursuing this analogy, if arbitrators are professional people, it can be expected that the usual variations exist in
their competence, or at least in their reputation for competence,
and that the clientele may be expected to pay more for the services
of some arbitrators than for others. This would be true even for
the so-called "routine" case. Arbitrators serving under some umpire systems with large corporations and large unions are much
more highly compensated than are ad hoc arbitrators or those
serving under some "lesser" umpire systems. This is some indication of acceptance of the concept that arbitration has become a
true profession.
We suggest, however, with some diffidence that the attempt
price of commodities and services over the past decade, as may be seen below, overhead
costs both for arbitrators and law practitioners certainly have increased. Thus, the percentage rise in net income of arbitrators may be less than Fleming's figures would suggesL
AVERAGE GROSS AND NET RECEIPTS OF SOLO LA.WYERS, PHYSICIANS
AND DENTISTS FOR PERIOD 1951-1960

Lawyers
Physicians
Dentists

Gross:
Net:
Gross:
Net:
Gross:
Net:

1951

1960

$8,011
4,408
18,235
10,466
12,902
6,560

$13,981
7,257
29,388
17,183
22,411
11,511

Increase

Data for 1951 derived from U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, IRS PUB. No. 79, STATISTICS OF INCOME FOR
1951 at 88 (1952). Data for 1960 derived from U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, IRS PUB. No. 453, STA•
TISTICS OF INCOME FOR 1960-61 at 11 (1962).
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX PERCENTAGE INCREASE-1953-1962
(1957-1959 = 100)
All Items
All Services
Medical Care Services
Transportation Services
Hospital Rates

1953

1962

93.2
87.5
83.0
85.2
74.8

105.4
109.5
116.8
111.2
13D.4

Increase

13%
25%
40%
31%
74%
Data derived from BUREAU LAB. STAT., BULL. No. 1351, PRICES: A CHARTBOOK, 1953-62
tables A-1. A-59, A-60, A-84, A-86, A-87; BUREAU LAB. STAT., BULL. No. 1351-1 (Supp.),
PRICES: A CHARTBOOK, 1953-62, table 1.
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to analogize arbitrators to lawyers, physicians or other professional
groups (a tendency we do not necessarily ascribe to most arbitrators) may be unsound, and, indeed, that we may have used the
term "professionalization" improperly in relation to the arbitration process. Arbitrators do, indeed, serve a "clientele," who pay
for the services rendered, and we have no doubt that the services
rendered call for many of the qualities of education, skill, and
expertise which characterize the professions. But arbitrators are
called upon to adjudicate disputes, not to act as counselors or advisers. They serve not only the parties but also the public interest
in peaceful industrial relations. Their work is the kind which is
performed by judges in some other countries, and, indeed, would
be performed in many instances by judges in this country if the
parties were to discard voluntary, private arbitration. It may be
more appropriate, therefore, to compare arbitrators with judges
and others who render a high level public service rather than
with lawyers and doctors in appraising the fee question and comparing income data.
A final point to bear in mind is that the arbitrator's charges
may well be (and we suspect ordinarily are) a minimal part of
the total costs involved in processing a grievance or other case
through arbitration. Employee, union, and man?gement investigation and preparatory time is involved, from beginning to end, and
lawyers are frequently used. We do not mean to minimize the
significance of the cost factor attributable to arbitrators, but we
think in all fairness that the actual facts concerning trends in their
charges, as well as other costs relating to the grievance and arbitration process, should be developed and studied carefully before
criticisms are made. It may be that some parties, especially small
unions, need an arbitration forum which costs them little or
nothing for the resolution of grievances. If so, the answer may lie
in special statutory enactments.
We assume, for purposes of this appraisal, the desirability of
continuing our system of private arbitration. Perhaps the cost
and some other elements inherent in the system warrant review of
this assumption and consideration of the substitution of labor
courts. But even within the general framework of private arbitration there are ways to meet the problem of costs in the case of
parties who genuinely need relief. The arbitrators themselves
could (and we suppose sometimes do) undertake such cases without charge, or at reduced costs, and through local associations such

1146

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

62

as the NAA regional groups could devise a procedure for determining the merits of taking and then of assigning cases on this
basis. Alternatively, state or federal agencies could be authorized,
as in some states, to provide such a service.36
6. The Arbitrator-His Qualifications, Role, and
Decision-Making Processes
Almost without exception our respondents take the view that
the arbitration process would be improved if arbitrators were more
competent. The remark of one respondent, "The principal difficulty which we now experience with the arbitration process lies
with the arbitrator," and that of another who refers to the arbitrator as "the weakest link in the chain," reflect the views of many.
The basis for such reactions is not always explicated. Where
stated, the range of views is interesting, to say the least, and reveals
both emotionalism and cynicism, as well as judgments which are
sober and reflective. Management representatives seem to be more
critical than union representatives, which is perhaps understandable since they are usually on the "receiving" end of contract
grievances. Some believe arbitration would be improved if arbitrators had more industrial experience and included fewer "social
reformers," especially of the "academic" variety. Some are suspicious of all arbitrators for the reason indicated in the following
expression from one of our respondents:
"Arbitration is a business. If an arbitrator decides too
many cases in favor of either party, he will be put out of
36 Under Michigan law it is provided that" •.. the board [Labor Mediation Board]
may, upon the request of the parties and the finding that the parties, or either of them,
are unable to bear the expenses of the arbitration, designate an arbitrator for the dis•
pute, in which event the expense of the arbitration, including a per diem fee of $50.00
and necessary expenses of the arbitrator, shall be paid out of the general fund. • • ."
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.454 (10.3)(2)(b) (1960). So far as we are aware, this provision has
had little, if any, use.
Under a recently adopted policy, announced by Richard E. Wanek, Minnesota State
Labor Conciliator, he and members of his staff of conciliators have made themselves
available to serve as arbitrators without cost to the parties. The policy, apparently, is
to limit this service to instances of "small cases where the parties cannot afford the expense and services of arbitrators from private employment." Comment of Conciliator
Wanek, 3 CCH LAB. L. REP., STATE LAws, 11 49514 (1963).
The extensive arbitration services rendered in New York State by the State Board of
Mediation are well known. This activity is unique in the quantity of free arbitration
services provided. Wisconsin also has provided this kind of service under the supervision
of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board since 1939, and in 1961, for example, the
service was utilized in 64 cases, most of them involving small employers. See Mueller,
The Role of the Wisconsin Employment Board Arbitrator, 1963 WIS. L. R.Ev. 47. Interestingly enough, a similar and active service is provided in Puerto Rico. Id. at 49.
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business. This factor must affect an arbitrator's decision. I
have heard arbitrators say otherwise. I am not convinced, any
more than I am convinced that my third step answers are
determined solely by whether or not there has been a contract
violation."
One of our respondents remarked, with considerable profundity,
"If all arbitrators . . . could combine the best qualities of all
the ones I have encountered, there would be little need to worry
about improving the 'process' as an institution." The problem
apparently is the universal one, common to all human institutions
and endeavors, of seeking movement toward this kind of lofty
goal.
On one poi:µt of arbitration "practice"-whether the arbitrator should act only as a judge and refrain from attempting mediation-our respondents indicate almost complete unanimity of
view. They want a judge! And they tend to single out the university professor as the kind of arbitrator most likely to essay a mediatory role. This criticism is frequently associated with the view that
arbitrators, in their decisions, too often "compromise," "split decisions," and base decisions on other than proper contractual
grounds. 87
The question whether the arbitrator should ever attempt to
"mediate" in a case submitted to him for arbitration is one of
long-standing controversy. Some distinguished and able men have
debated this issue,88 and there is no need to review the arguments,
87 One respondent states: "We do not look for mediation but we do look for a decision based upon the applicable terms of the contract. Arbitrators should confine themselves to the contract and leave Industrial Relations to some one else."
88 An analysis of the essential differences in these roles is made by Sylvester Garret in
The Role of Lawyers in Arbitration, ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 102-24 (Pollard ed.
1961). For expositions by proponents of the use of mediation, at least "when appropriate,"
see SIMKIN, ACCEPTABILITY AS A FAcrOR IN ARBITRATION UNDER AN EXISTING AGREEMENT
61-63, 66-67 (1952); Gray, Nature and Scope of Arbitration and Arbitration Clauses, N.Y.U.
1ST ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 197, 199 (1948); Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in
Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REV. 999, 1022-23 (1955); Symposium on Arbitration, 15 Lab.
.Arb. 966, 968 (1951); Singer, Labor Arbitration: Should It Be Formal or Informal?, 2 LAB.
L.J. 89, 91-93 (1951); Syme, Opinions and Awards, 15 Lab. Arb. 953, 954-55 (1951); Taylor,
Effectuating the Labor Contract Through Arbitration, THE PROFESSION OF LABOR ARBITRATION 20 (BNA 1957); Taylor, Further Remarks on Grievance Arbitration, 4 ARB. J. (n.s.) 92
(1949); The Voluntary Arbitration of Labor Disputes, PROCEEDINGS, MICHIGAN LAw SCHOOL
SUMMER INSTITUTE ON THE LAW AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 191 (1950).
For expressions of doubt or opposition, see DAVEY, CONTEMPORARY CoLI.EcrIVE BARGAINING ch. 12 (1951); Kfil.LOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 84-85 (1948), cited and quoted in
4 ARB. J. (n.s.) 182, 184 (1949); MORSE, THE JUDICIAL THEORY OF ARBITRATION IN UNIONS,
MANAGEMENT AND THE PUBLIC 489 (Bakke &: Kerr ed. 1948); UPDEGRAFF &: McCoy, .ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES 203, 204 n.19 (BNA 1961); Bailer, Arbitration Procedure and
Practice: Arbitrator P'iewpoint, N.Y.U. 15TH ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 349 (1962); Braden,
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which are well known. Our contribution on this subject consists
principally of our report of current feeling as expressed by our
respondents. We would add only our own belief that, especially
in view of the parties' expectations, the presumption should be
against mediation efforts, but we are sure there are instances in
which mediation can and should be undertaken, especially where
there is some indication from the parties (which may have to be
read into their approach to the case) that mediation would be
welcomed. We know there have been situations in which sophisticated and experienced arbitrators have successfully undertaken
mediation, even in ad hoc arbitration.
The charge that arbitrators tend to compromise and to split
decisions because of the problem of acceptability is one that should
be met and appraised. The pat answer from the arbitration fraternity is simply a flat denial. Indeed, the arbitrator is likely to say
that to split decisions consciously is the best and surest way to
lose acceptability, presumably because, ultimately, "the truth will
out," and the parties will come to realize that they cannot be sure
that a case will be approached on its merits. We share this general
view (naturally), and we doubt that any arbitrator will publicly
declare otherwise. All arbitrators will say that they call the shots
The Function of the Arbitrator in ·Labor-Management Disputes, 4 ARB. J. (n.s.) !15 (1949);
Davey, The John Deere-UAW Permanent Arbitration System, CRITICAL ISSUES IN LAllOR
ARBITRATION 161, 162, 185 (BNA 1957); Davey, Labor Arbitration: A Current Appraisal,
9 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 85 (1955-56); Davey, The Proper Uses of Arbitration, 9 LAB. L.J.
119 (1958); Davey, Hazards in Labor Arbitration, I IND. & LAB. REL. REv. !186 (1947-48);
Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 196!1 Wis. L. REv. ll (196!1); Gellhorn,
Symposium on Arbitration, 15 Lab. Arb. 966, 969 (1951); Iserman, The Arbitrator in
Grievance Procedures: Is Arbitration the Way To Settle Labor Disputes?, !15 A.B.A.J. 987,
990 (1949); Johnson, Contrasts in the Role of the Arbitrator and of the Mediator, 9 LAD.
L.J. 769, 772 (1958); Livingston, Arbitration: Evaluation of Its Role in Labor Relations,
N.Y.U. 12TH ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 109, 119 (1959); McCoy, Symposium on Arbitration,
15 Lab. Arb. 966,968 (1951); Merrill, A Labor Arbitrator Views His Work, IO VAND. L. REv.
789 (1957); Miller, Comments on the Doctrine of Acceptability of Labor Arbitration
Awards: Mediation vs. Arbitration, 4 ARB. J. (n.s.) 182 (1949); O'Connell, Arbitration Procedure and Practice: Management Viewpoint, N.Y.U. 15TH ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAn. lllll,
3!12-34 (1962); Segal, Arbitration: A Union Viewpoint, THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES
47, 55-56 (BNA 1958); Trotta, Discussion-Arbitration: A Management Viewpoint, THE
ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES 76, 89-91 (BNA 1958).
See also BRAUN, LABOR DISPUTES AND THEIR SETTLEMENT 150, 202 n.6!1 (rev. ed. 1955);
Ferguson, Cooper & Horvitz, An Appraisal of Labor Arbitration, 8 IND, & LAB. REL. REv.
79 (1954-55); Platt, Current Criticisms of Labor Arbitration, ARBITRATION AND THE LAw vii
(BNA 1959); Survey conducted by Yale Law School, Labor Law Section of Conn. Bar
Ass'n, AAA and L-M Center of Yale University in 1951, 6 ARB. J. (n.s.) 70, 7!1 (1951);
Warren & Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 16 Lab. Arb. 970, 981-82 (1951).
It is of some interest to note that the 1962 survey made by the National Academy of
Arbitrators reveals that 156 arbitrators responding to the questionnaire on this issue
indicated that they attempted mediation in 323 cases (5.1 % of the total caseload handled),
and were successful in 171 of such cases for a "batting" average of 52.9%, See note 29 supra.
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as they see them, and that if this means that twenty cases on a
docket come out for one side or the other, so be it. In the belief
that arbitrators do tend to split decisions, some parties, especially
on the management side, consider it preferable to arbitrate only
one issue at a time, and to insist upon a different arbitrator for each
case. This approach may avoid the problem, if there be one, of
split decisions, but it also greatly increases the cost of arbitration.
We believe most arbitrators are honest in their expression
that they look at their cases "one at a time." We must admit,
however, that these declarations are self-serving, and we know of
no easy or reliable way to test the merits of the charge made against
the arbitrators, or their answer. We would like to see a serious
attempt made to research the matter. Without doubting for a
moment the sincerity of arbitrators as a whole, we must concede
the possibility that there may be some subconscious, psychological
factor present in their mental processes, deriving from the problem of "acceptability," which would not be present if, for example, they had the tenure of federal judges.
To proceed to another point, there appears from our survey
to be general agreement that the arbitrator should base his decision "on the contract," but it is not clear just what is meant by this
general precept. Some say that the literal language of the agreement should be controlling; others say the problem is to determine
"the intent of the parties," and take the view that the contract
language is not always reliable in indicating such intent. We find
among our respondents a preponderant view (perhaps because a
preponderance of our replies are from the management side) that
the arbitrator should disregard past practice and considerations of
equity. Frankly, we find little that is useful or constructive in
these generalizations. The determination of the intent of the parties on an issue of contract interpretation is frequently a thorny
problem; otherwise, the case might not be before the arbitrator.
An appraisal of this process is beyond the scope of this review.
We find among our replies, sometimes even from the same respondents, the complaint on the one hand that arbitrators often
do not answer fully and directly the arguments made by the parties, and on the other hand that arbitration opinions tend to be
too lengthy. There is some inconsistency here, although there are
instances in which the undue length of opinions is attributed to
an attempt to soften the blow by giving the "decision" to one side
and the "opinion" to the other, or to attempt to "opine" too
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broadly and thus, as one remarked, "to muddy up the decision
and create new grounds for grievances." Some think there are few
decisions which could not, with profit to all concerned, be reduced
in length by at least fifty percent.
We simply report these complaints without attempting to assess their general validity. There is little doubt that some opinions
are unduly prolix, insufficiently responsive to the precise claims
presented, and, like some of our more notable Supreme Court
opinions, liberally laced with "dicta" which may represent profound wisdom but not a kind of professional service which the
parties have sought or desire. It is our impression that the more
seasoned the arbitrator, the less guilty he is of these transgressions.
It is also our impression that there are occasions when the "full"
opinion is not only desired by the parties, but helpful. There are
controls which are available to the parties. They can indicate the
kind of opinion they want, or even agree to eliminate opinions
altogether, and simply take the "award." They can also agree
upon a "short form" summary opinion as adequate for particular
cases.89
Our respondents, particularly from the management side, indicate that there is rather considerable support for the proposition
that arbitrators should make greater use of "precedent" in deciding cases. The younger arbitrators, it is suggested, should pay
more heed to the decisions of their older and more experienced
brethren in order to reduce the likelihood of error. The point
most frequently made, however, is that there should be greater
use of precedent in order to increase "predictability." One management attorney remarked:
"The only matter of any substantial nature which I find
undesirable in the arbitration process is the absence of a basis
to advise companies with respect to contemplated action in
accordance with what arbitrators have done in similar cases.
I am afraid that a few arbitrators are over-anxious in their
desire to show that they are not bound by stare decisis."
This is likewise a subject of long-standing controversy. Opinion
among academic "experts," arbitrators, and partisan representatives runs the gamut.40 There are those who believe that the use
39 See Seitz, An Open Letter to a Union Attorney, 17 ARB. J. (n.s.) 67 (1962). This
article contains an excellent discussion of why arbitrators in general believe it necessary
to explain fully their awards.
40 On this subject see ELKOURI 8: ELKOURI, How .ARl!rrn.ATION WoRKS 243 (rev. ed.
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of precedent should be eliminated altogether, and that a disservice
is being performed even by the publication of awards. Proponents
of this view feel that an arbitrator is employed by the parties to
focus his attention exclusively on the case presented to him, and
that this ought to mean that he should not dilute the purity of his
mental processes through exposure to the views of others who appear to have met similar problems. Advocates of this position likewise deplore the development of a case law of "industrial jurisprudence" as introducing improper rigidities into the area of contract
interpretation.
Probably the middle view, on the whole, has the most widespread support. This view holds that, while precedent should not
be considered binding, and while cases typically are never on all
fours with others, there is educational value in published opinions,
and there is no reason why the product of the thought of other arbitrators and, indeed, the summaries of positions taken by other
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parties, should not be available for consideration, subject always to
the qualification, which every experienced arbitrator understands,
that it is his judgment that is expected by the parties. We subscribe to this view, and in any event we think it inevitable that
this will be the continuing course of development.
One of the major problems, however, in connection with the
use of published arbitration awards by arbitrators, parties, and
students of labor relations arises out of the limitations in the process of publication, as presently practiced. Unlike the awards of
appellate courts, all or most of which are systematically published,
the publication of arbitration awards is a private procedure with
limited publication (as, for example, in the case of the General
Motors-UAW Umpire decisions), or publication by private publishing houses on a selective basis of awards submitted to them.
The total of all published awards is a very small percentage of all
the decisions rendered, and there is no assurance that what is published represents a proper sampling of all the decisions rendered
in particular subject areas, or even a proper sampling of those submitted for publication. What, if anything, can be done to improve
this situation we do not know. Possibly the various publishing
houses, the appointing agencies and the National Academy of Arbitrators should establish some procedures for joint discussion of
the problem.
The matter of precedent within a given employer-union contract relationship obviously presents special problems. Here there
is much to be said for respecting prior decisions, especially if the
parties have not repudiated them by making changes in pertinent
contract language. In this context the argument for predictability
is compelling. Substantial consistency in the treatment of problems of contract application probably accords with the expectations of the parties, at least under umpire systems, and contributes
to the stability of the relationship. This is not to say that an umpire should not "overrule" a previous interpretation which he
considers palpably wrong. It is simply to say that he should do
so only after the most serious deliberation.

7. Responsibilities of the Parties
Our respondents concede that the arbitration process would
be improved by more adequate screening of cases, so that only
cases presenting bona fide issues go to arbitration. This kind of
observation is so obviously correct as to be trite. Experience under
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some of the major umpire systems, such as General Motors, Ford
and International Harvester, show that startling results in this direction can be achieved. Adequate and responsible screening,
however, is doubtless politically impossible within some unions,
and may now be complicated by an increased reluctance on the
part of some union leaders, due to fears of legal liability, to step
up to their responsibilities. Nevertheless, as one of our respondents
comments, it makes little sense to pass the responsibility on to an
arbitrator to make a decision that should have been made by the
parties, especially if he is then irresponsibly denounced by the
irresponsible party for making a "poor" decision.

C.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

It is interesting to note the general tenor of the current appraisals of the arbitration process as revealed by our survey. Emphasis appears to be centered on "legal" and procedural matters,
although, interestingly enough, only one of our respondents suggests that only lawyers should be arbitrators. This emphasis is
likewise reflected in the subject matter considered at the annual
meetings of the National Academy of Arbitrators, and in much
of the research and writing on arbitration in recent years. Many
of the problems which now concern arbitrators and the parties are
not those which troubled "Billy" Lieserson and Harry Shulman,
or for that matter, even now trouble George Taylor.
Yet it remains the fact that many people still want arbitration
to remain the informal, inexpensive, expeditious problem-solving
process which, perhaps, was its chief claim for support in the past.
It probably can still be that if the parties wish it that way. Our
guess, however, is that for a variety of reasons, including recent
legal developments, the professionalization of the arbitrator and
the increased use of attorneys, the trend will be in the direction
of greater emphasis upon the quasi-judicial role of the arbitrator,
and upon related matters which will make the process more palatable in the light of the present state of the law concerning the
finality of the arbitrator's determination.
APPENDIX

The standard form of "Individual Arbitration Agreement," suggested for use at the
local level, contains the following provisions:
"Section 1. In the event of any difference arising between the parties to this contract which cannot be adjusted by conciliation, such difference shall be submitted to
arbitration under the Code of Procedure provided by the International Arbitration
Agreement, effective January I, 1963, between the American Newspaper Publishers
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Association and the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of North
America.
"Section 2. This contract shall cover any contract between the parties of the first
and second parts whether the same is in writing or an oral understanding, subject to
the conditions expressed in the International Arbitration Agreement, effective January
1, 1963, between the American Newspaper Publishers Association and the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of North America.
"Section 3. It is expressly understood and agreed that the International Arbitration Agreement and the Code of Procedure, both hereunto attached, between the
American Newspaper Publishers Association and the International Printing Pressman
and Assistants' Union of North America shall be integral parts of this contract and
shall have the same force and effect as though set forth in the contract itself.
"Section 4. The parties hereto specifically authorize the Board of Directors of the
International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of North America and the
Special Standing Committee of the American Newspaper Publishers Association to
give public disavowal to any failure to comply with this contract as provided in
Section 13 of the International Arbitration Agreement."
The "International Arbitration Agreement" between the ANPA and the International
Pressmens' Union provides, among other things, as follows:
"Section 3. Any publisher, who holds an Individual Arbitration Contract under
the prior Agreement between the parties hereto which terminated December 31, 1962,
and whose Individual Arbitration Contract does not provide for continuation beyond
December 31, 1962, shall be protected hereunder, if, before March I, 1963, he shall
have secured an Individual Arbitration Contract in accordance with the provisions
of this Agreement.
"In like manner the union and members thereof shall be protected against lockouts or any other concerted action to discriminate against members of the union
upon the part of the publishers, provided said union or members thereof have complied with the terms of the Agreement.
"Section 4. Subject to the conditions specified in Section 2 every member of the
American Newspaper Publishers Association shall have the following guaranties:
"(a) He shall be protected against walkouts, strikes, boycotts or any action by
members of the union or unions with which he has contractual relations under this
Agreement (such as unauthorized vacations, or individual resignations) which shall
tend to delay publication, and against any other form of concerted interference by
them with the normal and regular operation of any of his departments of labor.
"(b) In the event of a difference arising between a publisher having an arbitra•
tion contract or argeement and any local union a party thereto, all work shall continue without interruption pending proceedings looking to conciliation or arbitration,
either local or international, and the scale and hours provided in contract between
the parties and working conditions prevailing prior to the time the differences arose
shall be preserved unchanged until a final decision of the matter at issue shall have
been reached.
"(c) All differences which cannot be settled by conciliation shall be referred to
arbitration in the manner stipulated in this Agreement. This sub-section is hereby
construed to contemplate the submission to arbitration of all questions which involve
the cost, working conditions, efficiency and administration of the services of members
of the I. P. P. & A. U., in the operation of the newspaper press rooms but not to
include such matters as have to do solely with the internal laws of the I. P. P. & A. U.
relating to its self-government.
"(d) Except as set forth in Section 8, it shall be competent on 10 days' notice in
any local or international arbitration bearing for either side to raise the point that
certain matters are not properly arbitrable and if the other side denies the claims,
the question raised as to the arbitrability of an issue shall first be determined by the
International Arbitration Board before any evidence is beard as to the merits of the
issue claimed not to be arbitrable.
"Section 5. (a) It is agreed that the procedures herein provided for settling
disputes by local and international arbitration of issues shall be used to the exclusion
of any other means available to the parties who sigu this Agreement under which
all decisions are final and binding on both parties. Any rights or remedies otherwise
available to the parties to this Agreement are hereby expressly waived. .
"(b) It is also agreed that the procedures for the remedy of grievances and settlement of disputes provided herein are to be applied promptly. In the event either
party fails to act promptly to bring a dispute to a bearing or refuses to appear at any
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proceeding conducted under this Agreement, then the provisions of Section 5, subsection 11 of the Code of Procedure shall apply.
"Section 6. All differences arising under an existing written contract, or an oral
understanding, which involve the application of the International Arbitration Agreement as specified in Section 2, the Code of Procedure, or any clause or clauses in
contracts, or the interpretation to be placed upon any part or parts of any agreements, which cannot be settled by conciliation, shall be referred to local arbitration
if so required by the local contracts, but if not, shall be submitted to the chairman
of the Special Standing Committee of the American Newspaper Publishers Association and the president of the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union
of North America, together with the arguments and briefs of both parties, and an
agreed statement of facts in the controversy, accompanied by a joint letter of transmission, certifying that each party is familiar with the contents of all documents.
In case these two officials cannot reach a decision upon the issues involved, their
differences shall be submitted to the International Board of Arbitration.
"Section 7. All differences other than those specified in Section 6 of this Agreement, including disagreements arising in negotiations for a new scale of wages, or
for hours of labor, or in renewing or extending an existing scale, or in respect to a
contract, which cannot be settled by conciliation, shall be referred to a local board
of arbitration in the manner stipulated in the Code of Procedure as set forth in
Exhibit 'B'. But the International Board of Arbitration may, in its discretion,
assume jurisdiction over any dispute that is jointly submitted by the local parties
signatory to this Individual Arbitration Agreement.
"Section 8. The question whether a department shall be union or non-union
shall not be classed as a "difference" to be arbitrated. A department shall be interpreted to mean the entire press room and not any portions of this department.
Union departments shall be understood to mean such as are made up of union
employes and in which the union has been formally recognized by the employer.
"Section 9. If either party to a local arbitration shall be dissatisfied with a decision by a local board, appeal may be taken to the International Board of Arbitration
to be constituted as hereinafter provided. Such appeal may also be taken to the
International Board by either party if for any cause a decision shall not have been
rendered by a local board within ninety days after the questions to be arbitrated
have been duly determined under the Code of Procedure.
"Section 13. At the request of either party to an arbitration the International
Board shall determine whether evasion, collusion or fraud has characterized either
the local or international proceedings, or whether either patty has failed to comply
with, or refuses to fulfill its obligations under a decision, or has omitted to perform
any duty prescribed therein, or has secured any unfair or fraudulent advantage, or
has evaded any provision of this Agreement or any rule of the Code of Procedure,
or is not acting in good faith. At the conclusion of such inquiry it shall be wholly
within the power of the International Board to reject all that has been previously
done and order a rehearing before the International Board, or before a new local
board; or it may find against the offending party or annul the Individual Arbitration
Contract. In the event of either party to a dispute refusing to accept and comply
with a decision of a local board which is not appealed, or with a decision of the
International Board, or with any of the provisions of this International Arbitration
Agreement, as determined by a decision of the International Board all aid and support
to the employer or the local union refusing acceptance and compliance shall be
withdrawn by both parties to this Agreement. The acts of such recalcitrant employer
or union shall be publicly disavowed and the aggrieved party shall be furnished by
the other with an official document to that effect, signed by the Board of Directors
of the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of North America and
the Special Standing Committee of the American Newspaper Publishers Association."
Section 9 of the International Agreement, it will be noted, provides for an "appeal"
of a local arbitration decision. Of interest, also, is the breadth of the arbitration provisions, Apparently, under section 7 of the International Agreement even disputes over
the terms of a new agreement are arbitrable.
The "Code of Procedure" prescribed for local arbitration is quite detailed. With
respect to appeals to the International Board, it provides:
"Section 9. When either party to a local arbitration shall desire to appeal to the
International Board, written notice to that effect must be given to the other party
(specifying the points on which it wishes to base its appeal), within five (5) days
after the local decision has been rendered, and the appeal shall be filed with the
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International Board within thirty (30) days after such decision. When an appeal is
under consideration by the International Board of Arbitration it shall not take evidence, but both parties to the controversy may appear personally or may submit the
records and briefs of the local hearing and make oral or written arguments in support
of their several contentions. Each party shall submit eight copies of any brief for
appeal that he may desire to present for consideration of the International Board.
They may submit an agreed statement of facts, or a transcript of testimony, properly
certified to before a notary public by the stenographer taking the original evidence
or depositions. They may agree in advance not to appear personally at such hearing
on an appeal."

